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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERTS INVESTMENT COMP ANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
GI B B 0 N S AND REED CONCRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant,
GIBBONS AND REED CONCRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.
11254

v.
FRANK W. ROBERTS and W.
CALVIN ROBERTS dba ROBERTS INVESTlWENT C 0 MP ANY, et al.,
Defendants arul Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
1
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NATURE OF CASE

This is a consolidation of two separate actions, one :e
brought by respondent for slander of title, the other
by appellant for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien and a
money judgment for failure to obtain the bond required ti
by 14-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court, after a trial without a jury, dis·
missed the claims of all parties.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and
remand with directions to enter judgment against re·
spondents for $1,561.68, interest, and costs, including
an attorney's fee of $750.00.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents, Frank W. Roberts and W. Cal·
vin Roberts, co-partners doing business as Roberts
Investments (hereinafter called "Roberts") owned
real property at 3838 South Main Street, Salt Lake
City, upon which they undertook to construct a building
(R. 16), anticipating construction costs of approxi·
mately $200,000.00 ( R. 48) .
2
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In carrying out the project Roberts employed
:everal contractors to do different portions of the work
1.R. 48) . Among the contractors was American Conitruction Company, which was to be responsible for
rrection of the concrete walls for the building. This
iortion of the contract itself involved more than $500.00
·Jf construction costs, but Roberts
did not require
.lmerican Construction to furnish any performance
md payment bond (R. 16).
Between February 19, 1964, and April 15, 1964,
.lmerican Construction Company ordered and received
mncrete from appellant for use in construction of the
Roberts building, but on about the later date, the coniractor ran into construction problems, and dropped
two walls, causing damage. Roberts stopped American
Construction from further performance and took over
that portion of the work itself (R. 52-53). Between
about May 7, 1964, and August 20, 1964, Roberts
rurchased concrete from appellant of an agreed and
reasonable value of $7,505.64. It was used in construction of the building.
On August 27, 1964, Frank ,V. Roberts went to
ippellant' s off ice for the purpose of paying for the
roncrete it had purchased. Roberts then owed appellant
·)7,505.64 for concrete purchased by Roberts for con1truction of the building. The amount was liquidated
and undisputed. No portion of it arose out of the sale
8f concrete to American Construction Company.
American Construction Company, however, was
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then indebted to appellant in the amount of $1,561.68
for concrete furnished on the project before American's
work was taken over by Roberts. The amount owed by
American Construction Company was liquidated, was
maintained a.s a separate account, and was recorded on
a different ledger card than the Roberts account.
On the day Frank W. Roberts was in appellant's
office to pay the Roberts indebtedness both appellant's
general manager and its office manager inquired about
the debt of American Construction Company.
There is not much dispute about Frank W. Roberts'
reaction to inquiries concerning the American Con·
struction Company account. L. K. Bradley, appellant's
general manager, testified that Mr. Roberts said he
"wasn't obligated" to pay it (R. 36). Jan Zwet.s, appel·
lant's office manager, testified that Mr. Roberts said
it"was our problem to straighten out with American
Construction" {R. 44). Frank Roberts himself testified
that he told Zwets, "I am not going to pay anything
that American Construction owes," and that Zwets
could "either sign the lien waiver and I will pay this
[the Roberts debt], or for get it" ( R. 55). The testi·
mony of Zwets was that "I told him I would sign a
lien release for the amount owed Gibbons and Reed
by Roberts Investment" (R. 42). Zwets then signed
a recept for $7,505.64 (Exhibit D-1) which contained
lien release provisions aimed primarily at protection
of the construction lender, Valley State Bank.
Frank W. Roberts admitted that he paid appellant
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the exact amount owed for concrete purchased by
Roberts. Although there had been "a couple of discrepancies" these had been discussed and Robert~ was satisfied that the bill rendered was a proper bill. He also
knew that the claim for $7,505.64 did not include any
amounts of concrete purchased by American Construction Company while it was on the job. Nevertheless,
he told Jan Zwets that unless he signed the receipt he
would not be paid the amount admittedly owed by
Roberts (R. 61).

The document signed by Jan Zwets on Augu~t 27,
1964 (Exhibit D-1) is in the form of a receipt. Untitled, it reads as follows:
"Salt Lake City, Utah 8/27 1964
Received of Roberts Investments the sum of
Seven Thousand & Five Hundred & Five-&
64/100 DOLLARS ($7,505.64) in (full) payment for labor and/or material furnished by the
undersigned for the job at 3838 South Main
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
It is understood that this receipt is to be presented to VALLEY STATE BANK or assigns as evidence of payment of the amount
thereby receipted for to induce said VALLEY
STATE BANK or assigns to advance to the
owner of the property above mentioned money
to be secured by mortgage on said property,
and, in consideration thereof, it is agreed by the
undersigned with the VALLEY STATE
BANK or assigns that any lien .the undersigned
has or may have against real estate is and shall
be inferior, subordinate and subsequent to said
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mortgage; and further, and disputes over
amounts due and/or material delivered hereto.
fore between claimant and owner are waived and
settled and the undersigned releases the owners
from all and any claims the undersigned may
have against owner or materials delivered or
labor performed. For materials delivered to date.
8/20/64.

GIBBONS AND REED CONCRETE
PRODUCTS COMPANY
Jan Zwets, Office Manager
This Payment Covers Concrete Mat."

A few days thereafter, on September 2, 1964, ap·
pellant filed a mechanic's lien claim against the property
(R. 21) for the amount owed by American Construe·
tion, $1,561.68. The claim was inaccurate in that it
showed the first material to have been furnished on May
7, 1964, "to" Roberts Investments. Nothing was said '
about material furnished between February 19, 1964,
and April 15, 1964, at the request of American Con·
struction Company. On or about February 22, 1965,
an amendment of claim of mechanic's lien was filed
with the County Recorder in which the error was cor·
rected (R. 22-23) 1.
During the trial it was stipulated that if appellant
was entitled to an attorney's fee, such fee should be
fixed in the amount of $750.00 (R. 47).
1. The amended lien was filed to notify third persons of the
exact basis for appellant's claim of lien. Appellant does ~ot
contend that the amendment could validate the original lien
if it was not valid when filed.

6
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On March 13, 1968, the court filed a Memorandum
Decision (R. 28-29) in which it found, among other
things, that the release "was a release of all claims and,
therefore * * * that a judgment of no cause of action
should be rendered in favor of the [respondent] on
[appellant's J claim." This appeal involves only Gibbons
and Reed Concrete Products Company and Roberts
Investments. By stipulation of the parties the lien was
released and the sum of $2,400.00 was placed on deposit
to await further order of the court. Any judgment
entered, to the extent that the fund is available, will
be paid out of the fund or a supersedas bond given in
lieu of it. No appeal has been taken by any party other
than Gibbons and Reed Concrete Products Company.

ARGUMENT
I

THERE 'VAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR
A RELEASE BY APPELLANT OF ANY
CLAIM OTHER THAN THAT ARISING
FROM THE ROBERTS INVESTMENTS ACCOUNT.
The trial court without explanation or apparent
reason refused to apply contract principles which. have
been recognized by the Anglo Saxon courts for centuries and by this court since its inception. Courts, textwriters, legal encyclopedias and college professors agree
that promises and releases, to be enforceable, must be
7
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supported
Contracts,
Contracts,
76 C.J.S.,

by sufficient consideration 2 • Restatement of
§19; I Corbin on Contract, §109; 17 C.J.S.,
§§71, 402; 17 Am. J ur.2d, Contracts, §86;
Release, §IO; 45 Am. Jur., Release, §11.

Few material facts are in dispute. It is established
by the pre-trial order and trial testimony that on August
27, 1964, Roberts owed appellant $7,505.64 for concrete
used by Roberts in construction of its building. The
amount of the debt was liquidated, agreed to, undis·
puted, and not subject to any reasonable dispute. Yet
the trial court held that payment of the debt by Roberts
operated to discharge that company from an entirely
separate liability arising out of appellant's sales to
American Construction Company.
The ruling of necessity rejects the principle that
performance of a pre-existing legal duty does not constitute consideration for a promise or release.
In Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative,
11 Utah 2d 353, 359 P.2d 18 (1961) this court had
occasion to consider the effectiveness of an instrument
signed by Ray Tanner which purported to "release
and discharge" the cooperative "from any and all debts,
claims, demands and accountings of whatsoever name,
nature and description," except sums payable under
2. We recognize that some promise are enforceable without. c.on·
sideration, i.e., those under seal in some states, and those gi~ng
rise to a "promissory estoppel." We have limited the discussion
to consideration because no basis other than "sufficient con·
sideration" was relied upon by the court in enforcing the release
(R. 17-19). Although the question of estoppel was raised in t~e
pre-trial order (R. 18), no evidence was introduced to support it.
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some certificates of interest. The release was dated
October 7, 1952, and recited that the payment represented the "balance owed to me under the marketing
of my 1951 crop of turkeys." After signing the release
plaintiff brought an action against the cooperative for
balances owed for marketing his turkey crop between
1942 and 1951. The cooperative's defense that the
claims had been released was upheld in a summary
judgment but this court reversed on two grounds, one
of them that there was no consideration for the release.
The court said:

"* * * There was no consideration for the
release of obligations arising out of transactions
other than the marketing of the 1951 turkeys.
For defendants did only what they were otherwise obligated to do. The release expressly recites that the payment was made as the balance
owing for marketing the 1951 crop of turkeys.
On the face of the instrument it expressly appears that the payment was made to liquidate
that obligation, which defendants agreed was
the balance owning thereunder. All of the other
evidence tends to indicate that such was the fact
and that the parties had agreed to the amount
owing for the 1951 crop. All of the additional
evidence * * * definitely tends to indicate that
the amount paid was the exact amount which
defendant's books showed that it owed plaintiff
for the 1951 crop, and that plaintiff agreed to
this figure after defendants had produced all
their books and plaintiff's employees had twice
audited such books. The payment being for the
exact amount tt'hich the parties had agreed was
owing to plaintiff from the marketing of his
9
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1951 turkeys, there was no consideration given

for the release of any other liability which defendants owed to plaintiff." lEmphasis added.]

The present case cannot be distinguished. The
amount paid by Roberts Investments was the exact
amount the parties had agreed was owing to appellant
for concrete sold to Roberts Investments on its own
account.
In Brimwood Homes, Inc. v. Knutken Builders
Supply Co., 14 Utah 2d 419, 385 P.2d 982 (1963), a
liavings and loan company had made a payment and
obtained a release from a materialman. In an action
to foreclose a mechanic's lien the claimant contended
that it was the intention of the parties to release lien
rights only as to amounts set forth in the authorization,
and that there was no consideration to support the
promise to release any other lien rights that might be
acquired thereafter. This court upheld the contention,
saymg:

"* * * It must be noted that the defendant, in
receiving the payments from Prudential, was
being paid no more than what it was legally en·
titled to at the time. Thus, a promise by the de·
fendant to waive rights to future liens for other
debts would be without consideration."
A recent case applying the rule to a claim arising
under 14-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 (the private
bonding ~tatute) is Pierce v. Pepper, 17 Utah 2d 123,
405 P. 2d 435 ( 1965) . There the plaintiffs, employees
of a contractor, had been paid with worthless checks.
10
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Subsequently they went to the defendant builder who
paid them for part of their work on condition that they
sign releases and lien waivers for everything. Respecting
the transaction this court said:
"Having violated [the bonding statute], under
the facts of this case, there was no consideration
for the waivers, and the failure to require the
contractor to file a bond to protect these workers
under the plain wording of the statute, cannot
ameliorate the obligation of the builder from its
terms, by any no consideration David Harum
negotiation with the workers."
The above cases decided by this court are in accord
with Restatement of Contracts, §76:
"Any consideration that is not a promise is
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of §19 ( c) 3,
except the following:
" (a) An act of forbearance required by a legal
duty that is neither doubtful nor the subject of
honest and reasonable dispute if the duty is
owed either to the promissor or the public, or,
if imposed by the law of torts or crimes, is owed
to any person; * * *"
Illustration No. 5 following the quoted rule, could
have been adopted from the facts in our case:
"A owes B a liquidated and undisputed debt
of $100. B has another claim against A, the
existence or amount of which is honestly and
reasonably disputed by A. A pays B $100 in
3. Section 19 ( c) provides that a "sufficient. consider~tion" is
one of the requirements of law for the formation of an informal
contract.

11
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return for B's agreement to accept the payment
in full satisfaction of both claims. There is not
sufficient consideration for B's agreement, since
A has paid only what he was under a duty to
pay."
§14:

The rule is similarly stated in 76 C.J.S., Release,
"A release of a legal obligation for which the
consideration is the performance by the releasee
of some undisputed legal duty owing by him to
the releasor or to a third person is invalid for
want of consideration. * * * So the full payment
of an admitted debt or the full performance of
one obligation is not consideration of a release
of a second debt or obligation."
Accord: 45 Am. Jur., Release, §13.

The rules as set out above are supported by an
annotation, "Payment of undisputed amount or liability
as consideration for discharge of disputed amount or
liability," 112 A.L.R. 1219, 1224, wherein it is pointed
out that there is very little conflict of authority on the
question of "whether payment of an undisputed claim
is a consideration for the discharge of another distinct ,
and independent disputed claim."4 • The general rule is
that it is not.
The facts in the present case are not novel, and
there is no apparent reason why the rule of law should
4. The annotator points out that there is a conflict of authority
on the question of whether payme,nt of the conceded part of a
single claim is sufficient considerat10n for release of the disputed
balance. That situation is not involved here.

12
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not be applied. The payment made by Roberts was for
concrete it purchased from appellant after taking over
the contract work. The payment could not be consideration for release of claims founded upon independent
transactions between appellant and American Construction Company, which arose by virtue of the lien
law (Title 38, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated 1953)
and a statute requiring owners to obtain performance
and payment bonds when undertaking substantial improvements on their property (Title 14, Chapter 2,
Utah Code Annotated 1953).
should be noted, also, that this was not a case
in which a debt was paid before it was due, or where
a debtor agreed to forego bankruptcy in exchange for
a release. The evidence is that Frank W. Roberts refused
to pay the amount admittedly due unless appellant's
office manager signed the release. There was no bargaining about due date or early payments. To constitute consideration, an act or forbearance must be "bargained for and given in exchange for the promise."
Restatement of Contracts, §75.J
[It

II

THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED THE RECEIPT AS A RELEASE OF
ROBERTS INVESTMENTS FROM LIABIL-

ITY.

The receipt signed by appellant's office manager,
reprinted herein at pages 5 and 6, should not have been

13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

construed as operating in favor of Roberts with respect
to the American Construction Company debt. It purports to be an agreement with Valley State Bank, not
with Roberts; and virtually all of the language is aimed
at protecting Valley State Bank, the construction mortgagee.
If the release is determined to be ambiguous,
appellant's position is aided by conversations that took
place when the receipt was given. At no time during
these conversations was it contended by Frank W.
Roberts that the receipt was to protect him and his
partner with respect to the American Construction
Company debt. His attitude was that the claim was not
his concern. He said the account was none of his busi·
ness, he didn't intend to pay it, and appellant would
have to work it out with American Construction. Not
once did he say that he intended the receipt to operate
as a release of the American Construction Company
debt. He must have believed that the partnership was
not liable for the American Construction Company debt
-and that a release of it was not necessary. Otherwise,
his conduct would amount to intentional deception.
The receipt having been prepared by Roberts, any
ambiguity should be resolved against it. The use of the
exact figure owed by Roberts Investments to appellant,
$7,505.64, would indicate that it was not intended to
cover other independent claims. The language in the
receipt is no broader than that considered by this court
in Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative, 11
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Utah 2d 353, 359 P.2d 18 ( 1961), discussed, supra.,. in
connection with consideration. The second ground for
reversal of the Tanner case was that the trial court had
misconstrued the release and had applied it too broadly
in light of the circumstances and recitals, respecting
which this court said :
"The release recites that in con~ideration of
the payment of $9,350.00 from the cooperative
' (being the balance owed to me under the marketing of my 1951 crop of turkeys) receipt of
which is acknowledged, I do hereby release and
discharge the said cooperative from any and all
debts, * * *' The release clearly states that the
$9,350.00 from the coopertaive was the balance
owing Tanner under the marketings of his 1951
crop of turkeys, payment of which he acknowledged. This would suggest that the release deals
with obligations of the cooperative arising out
of its marketing Tanner's 1951 crop of turkeys.
While the words dealing with the rdease do not
confine it strictly to obligations arising out of
the 1951 marketing when read in connection with
the preceding part of the sentence, it clearly
suggests that such was the intention of the parties. In view of this fact we conclude that the
release was ambiguous on this question, and that
the plaintiff was entitled to introduce evidence,
which showed that it was the intention of the
parties that the release was only of liability arising out of the 1951 marketing of turkeys."
The evidence introduced in this case indicates that
there was no bargaining between appellant and respondent respecting the application of the release to
the indebtedness arising out of the American Construe15

l
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tion Company purchases. Frank "\V. lloberts simply
denied that Roberts Investment had anything to do
with that obligation. There was no suggestion that
Gibbons and Reed should release the obligation in
exchange for the payment due, but only that it should
sign the receipt. In light of the fact that the language
of the receipt is directly primarily toward protection
of Valley State Bank, and the promises in it appear
to run to Valley State Bank, the court erred in construing the instrument as a release of appellant's separate
claim against Roberts.
III
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF ITS CLAIM,
INTEREST, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
In this brief, Point III is a consolidation of Points
IV and V of the statement of points filed with the
de_signation of record on appeal. It is based upon the
ground that appellant is entitled to judgment under
both the lien law and the private bonding statute.
Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, a deposit in
court will be applied to any judgment recovered by
appellant under either statute. It makes no difference
therefore, whether appellant's recovery is based upon
the lien law or the bonding statute, unless it is decided
that attorney's fees are not allowable in an action based
upon failure to obtain a bond.

16
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Appellant clearly is entitled to judgment under
14-2-2 Utah Code Annotated 19535 unless the receipt
was effective as a release of that liability. The building
as contemplated and constructed by Roberts as owner
exceeded the sum of $500.00; the portion to be constructed by American Const ruction Company exceeded
$500.00; and the contractor was not required to furnish
any bond at all. No question of timeliness having been
raised, the pre-trial order (R. 15-17) contains all of
the facts necessary to support a judgment under the
bonding statute.
Prior to 1963 the bonding statute contained only
two sections, one providing for an action on the .payment bond, the other permitting an action against the
owner for failure to require a bond. The section added
1963 (14-2-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953) provides:
"In any action brought upon the bond provided for under this chapter the successful party
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court, which shall be
taxed as costs in the action."
Although there is no express provision for attorney's fees in an action for failure to require a bond,
the sections should be construed in light of their obvious
5· "An~ person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who
shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond • • • shall
~e personally liable to all persons who have furnished material
labor under the contract for the reasonable value
0~ Performed
h
such material furnished or labor performed, not exceeding,
~wever, .in any case the prices against upon. Actions to recover
0lasts~h
liability shall be commenced within one year from the
forlll.ed~~ the last materials were furnished or the labor per-

17
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purpose, i.e., to protect laborers and materialmen who
improve real property, and to encourage owners to
require bonds. To achieve this purpose and avoid an
anomolous situation, 14-2-3 should be construed as
applying not only to actions on bonds, but to actions ,
against owners for failure to require bonds.
Regardless of the construction placed on 14-2·3,
appellant is entitled to an attorney's fee under 38-1-8
Utah Code Annotated 1953, part of the mechanic's lien
law. Under the admitted and stipulated facts, appellant
was entitled to judgment foreclosing its lien unless
two errors in the original lien were ~uch as to invalidate
it. The errors were ( 1) a statement that the first material
was furnished on May 7, 1964, rather than on February
19, 1964; and ( 2) a failure to state that the material
delivered between February 19, 1964, and May 7, 1964,
was furnished at the instance and request of American
Construction Company rather than Roberts Investments.
The above errors in appellant's claim of lien fall
far short-in quantity and magnitude-of those considered by this court in Chase v. Dawson et ux., 117
Utah 295, 215 P.2d 390 ( 1950). The contention in that
case was that the lien was insufficient because it failed
to state the nature and amount of materials furnished,
the use to which the materials were applied, to whom
the same were delivered, the terms and conditions of
the contract, and whether the one with whom the claim·
ant made the oral contract was an agent, contractor,

18
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or otherwise. Notwithstanding these objections the court
upheld the lien, saying:
"The notice of lien is no model. However,
substantial compliance with the statute is all that
is required * * *
"The instrument here in question clearly
shows that the building materials were furnished
to the owner, the first named defendant, and
used 'on and about the house on said land,' which
is fully and legally described by lot and subdivision. The notice recites that the materials
were furnished to the owner Kirby S. Dawson,
so that it matters not whether the materials were
ordered by the general contractor, or as to who
signed for them on the job."
In Hammond Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 94 Cal.
App. 119, 270 Pac. 751 (1928), the Supreme Court of
California upheld a lien although it incorrectly designated the contractor as an individual rather than a corporation. The court took the view that the lien law should
be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose, and
that injury from the misstatement is not to be presumed.

In Cook, Borden & Co., Inc. v. R. Z. L. Realty
Corp., 50 R. I. 375, 147 Atl. 891 (1929) the court took
the position that correction of a delivery date on a
claim of lien is permissible when the date as corrected
still leaves the delivery within the required period, there
being no "substantial alteration of the account."

In Central Construction Co,,;,,pany v. Hi,ghsmith

et al., 155 Neb. 113, 50 N.W.2d 817 (1952) the court

19
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had occasion to consider a mechanic's lien which had
been objected to because of errors in the names of the
persons for whom the work was done, and the dates
upon which the first and last materials were furnished.
The court noted that the object of the lien law is to
secure the claims of those who have contributed to the
erection of the building and that the legislation should
receive the most liberal construction giving full effect
to the provision. If errors are trifling and immaterial,
or if they are readily explainable as the result of mistake,
and no element of willfulness appears, the court said,
regard will be had for the imperfections of human
machinery, and the recovery of a just debt will not
be denied where nothing but fair dealing was intended.
The court then concluded that the three objections to
the lien were not valid since the errors were triflling
and immaterial.
Another case upholding liens against errors found
not to be substantial and prejudicial, and announcing
the rule of liberal construction, is Peccole et al v. Luce
& Goodfellow, Inc., et al., 66 Nev. 360, 212 P.2d 718
(1949}. See also Ellis-Mylroie Lumber Co. Co. v. St.
Luke's Hospital et al., 119 Wash. 142, 205 Pac. 398
(1922}.

The errors in the mechanic's lien in this case were
not such as might prejudice the respondents; moreover,
the errors were understandable since Roberts, after
taking the job, continued to use. the same personnel,
including the supervisor, that had been employed by
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American Construction Company. Under cross examination Frank W. Roberts admitted that as soon as he
discovered that the lien had been filed he knew that it
related to the concrete furnished to American Construction Company, which had been the subject of discussion on August 27, 1964.

CONCLUSION
The present case cannot be distinguished from
numerous cases, decided by this court and others, holding that the performance of a pre-existing legal obligation is not good consideration for a promise or a
release.
On August 27, 1964, Roberts paid appellant a
liquidated amount it admittedly owed. There was no
bargaining between the two companies with respect
to the release of any other claim, and it is apparent from
the conversations that there was no intention on the
part of either the appellant or Roberts to contract with
respect to either the claim against American Construction Company, or the liability of Roberts arising out
of the lien and the private bonding statutes.
The trial court should not have construed the receipt
as releasing Roberts Investments from any liability
other than the $7,505.64 account for which payment
Was made. If the receipt is so construed, there was not
suffieient consideration for it, and appellant is not
bound by it.
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_

The findings of fact and conclusions of law (R
17-19) contain no justification for the holding that
there was "sufficient consideration" for the release, and
the decision was not based upon evidence adduced at ·
the trial or on the application of ruling case law to
the facts established.
The judgment should be reversed and the case
remanded to the District Court of Salt Lake County
with directions to enter judgment in favor of appellant
and against respondents for the amount of the lien
claim, together with attorney's fees as stipulated, inter·
est, and costs of the action.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYCE E. ROE
ROE, JERMAN & DART
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
510 American Oil Building
Attorneys for Appellant

22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

